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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DEREK ANDREASON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20001014-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, in violation
of § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County, State of Utah,
the Honorable David L. Mower, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1999).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Was the evidence introduced at trial sufficient to overcome
defendant's motion to dismiss and support his forgery conviction?
Standard of Review: "A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss
presents a question of law, which [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness." State v.
Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ^[10,17 P.3d 1145. "When reviewing a bench trial for
sufficiency of the evidence, [an appellate court] must sustain the trial court's judgment

unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [the appellate court] otherwise
reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." American Fork
City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, ^4, 12 P.3d 108 (citations and quotations omitted).
Issue No. 2: Did the prosecutor's argument on the evidentiary inferences amount
to prosecutorial misconduct?
Standard of Review: "In determining whether a given statement constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the
evidence presented at trial." State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(citations and quotations omitted).
Issue No. 3: Were the trial court's findings sufficient to support defendant's
forgery conviction?
Standard of Review: "The ultimate test of the adequacy of a trial judge's
findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to
provide a basis for decision." State v. Magee, 837 P.2d 993,995 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(quotations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statute is reproduced in Addendum A.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged by information with three counts of forgery,
each third degree felonies, one count of racketeering, a second degree felony, and on
count of unlicenced practice of architecture, a class A misdemeanor. R. 1-3. Later, the
State voluntarily dismissed the racketeering and unlicenced practice of architecture
charges. R. T2:ll,73.
A bench trial was held before Judge David L. Mower. R. T2, T3. At trial, the
court granted defendant's motion to consolidate the three forgery charges and denied
defendant's motion to dismiss. R. T2:74-101. After considering the evidence, the court
convicted defendant of one count of forgery. R. T3:267-68.
Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of one
to fifteen years, and fined $9,625.00. R. 196-98,201-02. However, the court suspended
all but $1,500.00 of the fine upon defendant's completion of eighteen months probation
and sixteen days in jail. Id. The court also granted defendant's motion to stay the
execution of judgment. Id. Defendant timely appeals his conviction. R. 203-05.

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
In April 1998, seeking a county building permit, defendant appeared at the office
of John Hicks, Sevier County Building Official, and submitted a set of twenty-year-old
building plans for a four-plex apartment unit. R. T2:19-20, 27; Exhibit 2. Hicks
examined the plans and determined that they must be rejected. R. T2:20. Hicks
explained to defendant both in person and over the telephone, that the plans could not be
used because they were "too old" and the "codes had changed over 20 years." R. T2:20,
32-33. Hicks told defendant that the plans needed to be upgraded by an architect or
engineer. R. T2:20. On April 16, 1998, Hicks followed-up his conversation with
defendant by sending defendant a letter outlining the reasons for rejecting the plans. R.
T2:32-33;Exhibit 3 at Addendum B. That letter stated:
I have reviewed the plans you submitted for a four [sic] plex. These plans
are 20 years [sic] and the engineer[']s stamp is not legible.
Building codes and standards have changed dramatically over a period of 20
years. These plans must be reviewed and re-stamped by a Licensed
Architect or engineer prior to approval by the Seiver County Building
Department.
Id.
In response, defendant retrieved the plans from Hicks, but returned nearly two
weeks later with a clearer set of plans containing a legible architect's seal on the lower

!

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See
Spanish Fork v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61,12, 975 P.2d 501.
4

right-hand corner. R. T2:20, 22, 23-25; Exhibit l.2 Upon receipt of the plans, Hicks
immediately noticed that the architect's seal had not been properly "wet-stamped," in that
the architect, John Rowley, had not signed over the top of his seal. R. T2:20-21. When
Hicks notified defendant of the problem, defendant could not explain why the seal had
not been wet stamped. R. T2:20-21; T3:230-32. Hicks then telephoned the Rowley
residence to resolve the problem. R. T2:21-22. Josephine Rowley answered Hicks' call
and explained that her husband had died two years earlier, in 1996. R. T2:22, 36-38.
Later, defendant returned to retrieve the second set of plans. R. T2:21. Although
defendant wanted both copies of the second set of plans, Hicks gave him only one copy
and delivered the other copy to the Utah Department of Professional Licensing for
investigation. Id. Further investigation of the second set of plans revealed that the
signature of the engineer, Allen K. Nielson, was not authentic. R. T2:56-65.
Upon rejection of the second set of plans, defendant took the plans to Stephen D.
Cohen, a structural engineer. R. T3:190-91, 201-02. Cohen reviewed the second set of
plans, removed the letterheads, made various upgrades pursuant to the current building
code changes, sealed, and wet-signed the plans. R. T3:201-02; Exhibit 33. Defendant
paid Cohen for his services. R. T3:202. Eventually, those plans were approved by the

2

At trial, neither defendant nor Hicks could remember if the second set of plans
were personally delivered by defendant or if they were left at Hicks' office by one of
defendant's employees. R. T2:26, 31; T3:175-76,197-98. Nonetheless, defendant
acknowledged tendering or uttering the second set of plans to Hicks. R. T3:75-76.
5

County. R. T3:191; Exhibit 38.
At trial, Hicks testified that he expressly told defendant that the first set of plans
needed to be upgraded or redrawn by the architect to reflect the changes in the current
code. R. T2:20, 29-33. Hicks also indicated that defendant was aware that the second set
of plans were "supposed to have been redrawn by the architect to make the code
changes." Id.
At trial, defendant testified that in 1978 he contracted with Rowley to design and
construct three four-plex apartment buildings. R.T3:160-65,180-81. Under the terms of
the contract, Rowley was to provide design services for "3 units only.'5 See Exhibit 5, p. 1,
6 at Addendum C. In addition, defendant agreed that Rowley was to review the
construction documents for compliance with the minimum building code requirements,
R. T3:164; Exhibit 5, p. 7 at Addendum C.
Defendant claimed that the second set of plans he gave to Hicks were copied from
an original which defendant had drawn in 1974, but which Rowley had altered in 1978.
R. T3:177-78. After contracting with Rowley in 1978, defendant claimed he gave his
drawings to Rowley, and Rowley cut and taped the plans to his border, sealed the plans,
and then returned them to defendant. R. T3:177-78; Exhibit 23. In April 1999, defendant
attempted to convince Josephine Rowley to confirm his story. R. T2:52-53. Defendant
asked Ms. Rowley to sign a letter verifying that her husband had cut and taped the plans
together. Id. However, Ms. Rowley refused to sign the letter because she was certain that

6

lici husband It.tcl n ,vi ai! and taped the plans together. R T2:52-54.
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the evidence sufficiently shows that defendant uttered the plans to Hicks with the intent to
defraud the County, Rowley, and the public, and that defendant knew he was facilitating a
fraud.
POINT II: Defendant next claims that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct by allegedly arguing facts not in evidence. Defendant points primarily to the
prosecutor's claim that defendant orally represented to Hicks that the second set of plans
had been properly reviewed and re-sealed by an architect. Such argument constitutes a
reasonable inference based on facts offered into evidence, which the prosecutor was
entitled to argue to the trier of fact. Therefore, the prosecutor was acting well within his
discretion.
Additionally, because on rebuttal defendant voiced his disagreement with the
prosecutor's assessment of the evidence, he cannot show that the trial judge was unaware
of the discrepancy. Thus defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the
prosecutor's arguments.
POINT III: Defendant also claims that the trial court's factual findings were
inadequate. However, the court's dialogue with defense counsel during closing argument,
and the court's oral findings offered in conjunction with its decision were sufficiently
comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for defendant's conviction.
Specifically, the court found that defendant uttered the second set of plans to Hicks,
misrepresented to the County that the plans had been properly reviewed and re-sealed by

8
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defraud Sevier County and the public, or had knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud,
the State will not address whether defendant intended to defraud or knew that he was
facilitating a fraud against Nielson.
A.

Because the State offered sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of
the forgery statute, defendant's motion to dismiss was correctly denied.

At the end of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the charges. R. T2:8997. Defendant claimed that the State did not show the requisite intent to defraud. R.
T2:92-97. The trial court listened to argument from both counsel and considered the
evidence presented by the State including reasonable inferences. R. T2:89-101. The
court found that the State had at least made a prima facie case for forgery, and denied
defendant's motion. R. T2:100-01. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying
his motion. Br. of Aplt. at 10-20. Given the evidence offered by the State and all
reasonable inferences, defendant's claim fails.
A defendant's motion to dismiss "requires the trial court to determine whether the
defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his defense." State v. Noren,
704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) (per curium). To survive a motion to dismiss based upon
a sufficiency challenge, there must be some evidence, including all reasonable inferences,
which support the elements of the charged crime. State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 535 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998). Therefore, "[a] trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss
presents a question of law, which [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness." State v.
Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, TflO, 17 P.3d 1145.
10

Defendant was charged with f o r g e u , ,* ti;.; j * _ - K
Code Ann § 76-<>-MH i IVWI
purpo

'

I iirnnih

I < ?<i '

:

Itah

'Z'n'1^- "t forgery it, v-_:L

m with knowledge that he is faciliuilinj: a fraud to be

perpetrated by anyone, he . . . —making

-

utters any writing so that the writing 01 u •

utterance purports to be the ac< - ...

501(7^ fl ^/ 4 -

vordmgly, l«- MII I, iv „i HIM

rtu.) «> JI

**uss the State must show be>o •*« a

lii.il defendant uttered a writing purporting to be the act of another,

"; that defendant either (a) acted with the intent to dciiaud anyone, t :
he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyi'iu

""'""' I In- (,^»i1c HCM-iiled sufficient

credible evidence on each d e m e n t .
(1)

U t t e r i n g of a writing purported to be the act of another.

Section 76-6-501(1) requires that an individual utter a writing pi..; -i\ - ,
act of another. See Utah Code Ann. fc lb b ")t< [ i >

l'l ' i

* « n i »| I
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jf

(2)

Intent to defraud or knowledge of facilitating a fraud.

To prove forgery under section 76-6-501, the State must also show either that the
individual acted with either intent to defraud or knowledge that he was facilitating a
fraud. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501(1) (1999). In State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214,
1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court paralleled the terms "purpose to defraud" and
"intent to defraud," defining them as "simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were
genuine in order to gain some advantage^

Id. (quotations omitted and emphasis added)

(citing State v. May, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (Idaho 1969)). Knowledge or intent may
generally be inferred from an individual's conduct viewed in light of all the
accompanying circumstances. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App. 289,1fl0, 988 P.2d 949.
Therefore, to prove intent to defraud or knowledge of facilitating a fraud, the State need
only offer "some facts or circumstances from which an inference can logically be drawn
before the defendant can be required to mount a defense and prove his lack of knowledge
or intent." Id. Further, "[b]ecause of the difficulty of proving knowledge and intent in a
prosecution for forgery, the quantum of evidence the State must produce before an
inference of knowledge or intent will arise should not be unrealistically burdensome." Id.
Here, the most important evidence presented during the State's case was the
substance of Hicks' conversation and letter to defendant. See R. T2:20, 32-33; Exhibit 3
at Addendum B. Through those communications, Hicks distinctly informed defendant
that the first set of plans (Exhibit 2) needed to be upgraded by either an architect or an

12

• i tu ieilect changes in the current building codes, See id, 1 he second parae*
of Hicks'letter states:
Building codes and standards have changed dramatically over* a period oi 20
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plans (Exhibit 1). See R 12:22, 36-38.
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rhe upgrade requirement
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construction could yield a deficient or potentially dangerous result. See R. T3:157-58.
Defendant knew that he would save money on construction of the four-plex under the outdated plans, while giving an unsuspecting member of the public the impression that the
edifice was new, safe, and in compliance with current building codes. See Kihlstrom,
1999 UT App. 289, flO. See also Winward, 909 P.2d at 912 (under section 76-6-501(1),
"it is sufficient for the State to show that a defendant's actions were designed to defraud
the public"). Thus, when defendant represented to Hicks that the second set of plans had
been "reviewed and re-stamped" by an architect, defendant exhibited both an intent to
defraud the County and a knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud on the public. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999).
In sum, the State presented a prima facie case that defendant committed forgery,
and the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss at the end of the States
case.
B.

The clear weight of the evidence offered at trial supports defendant's
forgery conviction*

Defendant next contends that the overall evidence offered at trial was insufficient
to support his forgery conviction, hence, the trial court's decision was allegedly against
the clear weight of the evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 21-31. Defendant's claim is refuted
above, based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the State's case-in-chief.
Nothing in defendant's case refuted the State's evidence. Indeed, a review of the entire
trial reveals that the evidence was more than sufficient to support defendant's conviction.
14
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108 (citing Spanish Fork City v\ Bryan, 1Q09UTApp(»l 1 « l i^j I'.id >' 11 iL |i> .1 ill..,
omitted)

T

~thc~^vords, an appellate comi

evidence »ui x..-.

•Ticient competent

\ h> enable the trier of fact lo Jricrmine, beyond

• i iM'^ii ifiable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. State v, Lyman, 966 P.2d
2/8,282 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
As stated, to survive a sufficiency t lulluigc, ihr "vidi'nrr offered at trial must
c

t*

•.

i", J^OILII'I" ill i|n I What defendant made or uttered a writing purporting
vt of another, and (2) that defendant either (a) acted with the intent to delraud

anyc—, ui (b) knew that he was facilitating a ts.iuv, »w u r v.;p_.
Code Ann. § 7^

A

* "*

ihc lolloping

evidciiir offered it fn:il \\Uw < oiilmns defendant's conviction.
(1)

Uttering of a writing purported to be the act of another.

Defendant admitted at trial that, following I hck^, ..,.•
he had copies ul the original p) n^ "H.HII.' :HI<I ihvn prese

* *;*

- *- opica io ilick& ii^~:l)

lull i I' I "! I/1' Vii Exhibits 1,2,23. Further, during closing argument,
defense counsel conceded that the second set of plans constituted a "writing" as do tin \\
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by section 76-6-501, and that defendant uttered those plans to Hicks. R. T3:264-66.
Defendant's admissions affirmatively established that he uttered a writing purported to be
the act of another.
(2)

Intent to defraud or knowledge of facilitating a fraud.

During his own presentation of evidence, defendant's intent to defraud both
Rowley and the public, and defendant's knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud,
became more apparent. At trial, defendant testified that he paid Rowley for his services
in 1979. R. T3:160-65,180-81. Those services included reviewing the construction
documents for compliance with the then-existing minimum building code requirements.
R. T3:180-82; Exhibit 5, p. 7 at Addendum C. Additionally, under the terms of their
contract, Rowley was to provide design services for "3 units only." See Exhibit 5, p. 1,6
at Addendum C. While defendant discussed building a fourth unit with Rowley, this
idea never came to fruition. R. T3:179-80. Accordingly, Rowley was paid for his services
on three edifices. R. T3:181-82; Exhibit 5, p. 6 at Addendum C. Because their contract
excluded any work on other projects, defendant would have been required to pay Rowley
additional money for revision of the first set of plans. See Exhibit 5, p. 6.
In fact, after his second set of plans were rejected by Hicks, defendant took the plans to
Stephen Cohen, a structural engineer, who charged defendant to review, revise, and reseal the plans. R. T3:190-91,201-02; Exhibit 33. Accordingly, defendant's
representation to the County that the second set of plans had been "reviewed and re-
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stamped" by Rowley, makes clear his intent to defraud the architect.
More imports 1

M oidviiu^.

u ,„i.

'

,Kls

iiiU Ins knowledge he was>

liifiliiiidiig that fraud. See Winward, 909 P.2d at 912, An examination of Cohen's
anvmuons reveals changes made in the interest of publu. flirty Act" hxJiibn U \ kn f
necessary and arguably more cost; * ... .., . • . •
• "' - •

increase in the

- • the concrete steps in the building's main

defendant admitted to knowing that the building codes had changed
ove* ihe :ast twen;\ vears. F T3:209-10. Clearly, uu^ -^ant was attempting lu M\\ C
money by compromising public health and siilcly.
C
d •

;

ocj w^

^ e pj a j n i a n g U a g e of Hicks' letter,

- fnlteied. See R. 13.20? -09. lie acknowledged receiving Hicks' letter, but

claimed that he was under the impression that Hicks wantcu v,m, *i wiwj. _.* . .
plans. Tic?. When asked w hj he .^^

••

;

'

peciiieally

reqiiiicJ iliai (In litsl .il uf nl m
i i hv "lovirwed and re-stamped," defendant offered no
reasonable explanation. See id. See also State v. Broun, 048 P.2d 566, 560 (T .:
(circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to suppot, . ,.•::....
exchange evinces defendant's cleai know ledge Ii
f

:,

;

* .

* * ~'diis were to haw

"uhitect or engineer.

Additionally, based on defendant's initial lack of candor when questioned about
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submitting an application five years earlier to renew his electrical contractor's license
using the name of a deceased master electrician, the court may have determined that
defendant was untruthful. R. T3:212-15. See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994) ("Clearly, the fact finder is in the
best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and is free to disbelieve their
testimony/') (quotations omitted). At first, defendant denied having any knowledge of
that event. R. T3:212-15. Eventually, however, defendant admitted that the accusation
was true. R. T3:226-28. Accordingly, the trial court had a reason to disbelieve
defendant's story that he had inadvertently disregarded the second paragraph of Hicks'
letter.
Given the clear weight of the evidence, the trial court correctly denied defendant's
motion to dismiss and convicted defendant of forgery.
POINT II5
THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENTS WERE
SUFFICIENTLY FOUNDED ON FACTS ADDUCED AT
TRIAL AND CONSTITUTED REASONABLE
INFERENCES; THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM FAILS
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct
by arguing facts not in evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 31-39. Specifically, defendant points to
various statements made by the prosecutor during his opening remarks, in his response to

5

Point II responds to Point IV of defendant's brief. See Br. of Aplt. at 31-39.
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defendant's motion to dismiss, and during closing argument. Id. Each of those
statements concern communications between defendant and Hicks regarding defendant's
submission of the second set of plans. See R. T2:89-101; T3:234-67. Essentially, the
prosecutor claimed that when defendant gave Hicks the second set of plans, defendant
represented either through his actions or orally, that the plans had been upgraded to
conform with the current building codes by a licenced architect. See R. T2:97; T3:23435,259-61.
Defendant's claim fails on two grounds: (1) in general, a prosecutor's statements
made in opening argument are not considered to be evidence, and (2) the prosecutor's
other statements made in response to defendant's motion to dismiss and in closing
argument are supported by record facts, and therefore constitute reasonable, and
permissible, evidentiary inferences.
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where (a) the remarks of the prosecutor call
attention to a matter that the trier of fact would not justified in considering when
determining his verdict; and, if so, (b) under the circumstances of the particular case,
whether the error is substantial or prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood
that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result. State v. Longshaw,
961 P.2d 925,928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
A.

The prosecutor's statements during opening argument are not
evidentiary.

Before the opening statements, the trial judge asked the prosecutor to "tell [him]
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about the accusations that are now outstanding [sic] that are going to be brought into issue
today." R. T2:11. In response the prosecutor named the charges against defendant and
then began his opening statement. R. T2:l 1-12. Defendant alleges that the following
statements made by the prosecutor during his opening statement are improper:
Approximately two weeks later, the first part of May, the defendant
returned with a set of plans, gave them to the building inspector, Mr. Hicks.
Mr. Hicks looked at the plans, asked him if he had returned them to the
architect and had them reviewed and updated. The defendant indicated that
he had.
From examining the documents, Mr. Hicks observed that the seal
from the architect was now readily readable. It had not been so on the
earlier set presented at the prior time. He asked if they had been returned.
The defendant indicated they had, they'd been reviewed by the architect,
and that they're now in conformity, in compliance.
R.T2:12-13.
Utah courts have long recognized that statements made during opening argument
are not evidence. See State v. Hall, 186 P,2d 970, 972 (Utah 1947). Furthermore, rule
17(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that the "prosecuting attorney may
make an opening statement... [then] [t]he prosecution shall offer evidence in support of
the charge." Utah R. Cr. P. 17(g) (emphasis added). Clearly, the above comments are
proper as an outline of the evidence to be proffered during the evidentiary phase of the
trial. See id. Because this case was tried before a judge, presumably the trial court is
well aware that opening statements are not evidentiary.
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B.

The prosecutor's arguments are supported by record facts and
reasonable inferences.

Defendant also challenges various arguments made by the prosecutor during his
response to defendant's motion to dismiss and in his closing argument. See Br. of Aplt. at
31-39. In particular, defendant complains that the prosecutor's statements that defendant
orally represented to Hicks that the second set of plans had been reviewed by an architect,
misstated the evidence. Id.
A prosecutor is accorded broad latitude in arguing his or her theory of the case to
the trier of fact. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^61, 979 P.2d 799. Further, "[wjhile
encouraging [the trier of fact] to consider matters outside the evidence is prosecutorial
misconduct... the prosecutor may fully discuss with the [trier of fact] reasonable
inferences and deductions drawn from the evidence[.]" Id. at ^59.
The record reveals the facts upon which the prosecutor's statements were based.
At trial, Hicks testified that upon receipt of the first set of plans from defendant, he
telephoned defendant. R. T2:20. Hicks informed defendant that the building codes had
changed and that he needed to have the plans upgraded by an architect or engineer. Id.
Hicks then included that same information in a letter to defendant. R. T2:32-33; Exhibit
3 at Addendum B. Two weeks later, defendant presented Hicks with the second set of
plans. R. T2:20. Hicks noticed that the plans had not been properly wet-signed and asked
defendant why the architect had not done so. R. T2:20-21. Defendant claimed to not
know the answer. R. T2:21.
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Given the fact that defendant twice received clear notice from Hicks that the first
set of plans had to be upgraded by an architect, it was reasonable for the prosecutor to
infer that defendant had intentionally represented the second set of plans as an upgraded
version, either orally or by his conduct. Because the prosecutor acted well within his
discretion in arguing that inference, defendant cannot show that the prosecutor improperly
called attention to a matter that the trial judge would not have been justified in
considering when determining his verdict. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 59; Longshaw,
961 P.2dat928. Therefore, no prosecutorial misconduct occurred. Id.6

Notwithstanding the fact that at trial Hicks did not expressly state that defendant
orally told him the second set of plans had been reviewed and re-sealed by an architect,
Hicks did offer that testimony at the preliminary hearing:
PROSECUTOR:

What did [defendant] tell you with regard to the
involvement of Mr. Rowley in the second set of plans?

HICKS:

I asked [defendant] when I first saw him - well, it [sic]
immediately got the red flag, because the seal had not
been what we call a wet stamp. It hadn't been signed
in ink over the seal. Therefore, it looked to me like it
was a copy.
So I told [defendant] - 1 asked him at that point if he
had actually sent these back to the architect or
engineer, whichever it was. He said, "Yes." That's
when I said, "Well, why didn't [the architect] sign the
stamp?"

R.Tl:44-45.
Although defendant's statements during this conversation between defendant and
Hicks were not specifically elicited from Hicks at trial, this evidence was placed before
22

C.

Because defendant expressly rebutted the prosecutor's characterization
of the evidence, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced.

To prove prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must also show that, under the
circumstances of the particular case, he suffered prejudice as a result of the prosecutor's
actions. See Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 928. Here, defendant expressly rebutted the
prosecution's characterization of the evidence after the prosecutor's arguments were
made. See R. T2:97-100; T3:249-50,253-57. Thus, defendant effectively notified the
trial judge of the alleged discrepancy. Accordingly, he cannot show that the trial court
incorrectly relied any material not in evidence when making his decision.
POINT III7
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE
SUFFICIENTLY COMPREHENSIVE AND
PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES TO PROVIDE A BASIS
FOR DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION
Defendant also claims that the trial court's finding were deficient. Br. of Aplt. at
39-40. While defendant acknowledges that the court did issue "some statements which
could be considered findings[,]" defendant complains that the those findings were not
specifically detailed as to each element of the forgery statute. Id. Defendant's claim fails

the trial judge, Judge Mower, through defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover. See R.
72A, 72B, 72C. After the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to quash his bindover
and included a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript as an exhibit to his
memorandum in support of his motion. See id. The preliminary hearing was held before
Judge Kay L. Mclff, who subsequently recused himself from this case. R. 32; Tl.
7

Point III responds to Point V of defendant's brief. See Br. of Aplt. at 39-40.
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because the court's oral findings were sufficient to provide a basis for defendant's
conviction.
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires findings of facts in all actions
tried without a jury. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).8 These findings may be expressed orally
following the close of evidence . Id. "The ultimate test of the adequacy of a trial judge's
findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to
provide a basis for decision." State v. Magee, 837 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(quotations omitted).
Prior to issuing its findings, the court questioned defense counsel with respect to
the various elements of the forgery charge.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, I also need to look at 76-6-501 and compare it
to the evidence that we've got here, and look at the verbs that are in 76-6501. Let's go to subsection (2) and look at the definition of "writing."
Does Exhibit No. 1 qualify as a writing, Mr. McCandless? Subs (A), (B),
and (C) are only examples. The definition is in subsection (2), any method
of recording valuable information.
MR. McCANDLESS: I think this is a broad definition.
THE COURT: Pretty broad, isn't it? So it probably gets Exhibit 1 included
as a writing.

MR. McCANDLESS: Yeah, I think we probably do.
THE COURT: So lets's go to subsection (1) and look at the verbs that are

8

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is applicable to criminal bench trials.
See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, n.2 (Utah 1988); Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e).
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there. "Alters" or "utters." . . . If we go to subsection (B), we get a whole
bunch of verbs there. Does an affirmative declaration by Mr. Andreason of
either taking Exhibit 1 into the County building and laying it on the desk, or
even saying words, [sic] Is that enough to fit any of those verbs that are in
sub (b)?

MR. McCANDLESS:... I think it would more clearly - - more easily fit
under an uttering.
THE COURT: Okay. So he walks into the County building with two sets of
Exhibit No. 1, and they leave his hands and end up on the desk. That's an
utterance.
R. T3:264-66. This dialogue evinces the court's determination that pursuant to the
forgery statute, the second set of plans were a writing purporting to be the act of another
and that defendant uttered those plans to the County. See id. The court then addressed
the remaining issue-whether defendant possessed the intent to defraud or knowledge that
he was facilitating a fraud-in its findings:
THE COURT: I'm prepared to make a decision in this case, [sic]
Appreciate what you've shown me by presenting the evidence and pointing
things out to me. It's an interesting case.
The facts have shown me, convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Andreason committed a forgery because he uttered Exhibit No. 1 to
Sevier County, and he intended that the utterance to be - - to have been
executed at a time and place other than in fact was the case. The reason I
reach that conclusion is because Exhibit No. 1 [the second set of plans] can
only be interpreted in light of Exhibit No. 3, Mr. Andreason's actions taken
in response to No. 3.
R. T3:267-68. Exhibit 3, referred to by the court, is the letter written by Hicks to
defendant informing him that the first set of plans must be reviewed and re-sealed by an
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architect prior to approval. See Exhibit 3 at Addendum B. The court's findings are
sufficient to indicate that its conviction is based upon defendant's intent to defraud Sevier
County and his knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud. See R. T3:267-68. The
court's reasoning is based upon its inference from the evidence that defendant was aware
that the first set of plans needed to be reviewed and re-stamped by an architect prior to
approval, and his presentation of the second set of plans containing a clearer architect's
seal without obtaining the required review. See R. T3:267-68; American Fork City v.
Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, ffl[9-10,12 P.3d 108 (a trial judge may reasonably make
conclusions based upon evidentiary inferences). Cf. State v. Eberwein, 2001 UT App 71,
f 14, 21 P.3d 1139 ("A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences
that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt.") (citations and
quotations omitted). Accordingly, the court's findings are sufficiently comprehensive and
pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for its decision. See Magee, 837 P.2d at 995.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction for forgery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J / ? _ day of August, 2001.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

COLEMERE
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Page 2
Ltion
JT S 76-6-501
:.A. 1953 § 76-6-501

Found Document

Rank 1 of 1

Database
UT-ST-ANN

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
PART 5. FRAUD
Copyright @ 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through End of 2000 General Session
5-501

Forgery --"Writing" defined.

J A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
/ledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such
>red writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes,
itters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
lentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be
act of another, whether the person is
existent or nonexistent, or
)orts to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence
>r than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such
jinal existed.
>) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage
;ransmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
ns such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money,
any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by
Dvernment or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
resenting an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest
:>r claim against any person or enterprise.
J) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
)IT
:ory: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-501; 1974, ch.
§ 19; 1975, ch. 52, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 15; 1996, ch. 205, § 27.
<General Materials

(GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Copr. ® West 2 001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

ADDENDUM B

Sevier County Building Department
Building Official
John L. Hicks

A p r i l 16,

County Courthouse
250 North Main
P.O. Box 517
Richfield, Utah 84701

(801) 896-9262 Ext. 220
Fax (8010 896-8888

1998

D & D Contracting
425 South State
Salina, Utah 84654
Dear D & D:
I have reviewed the plans you submitted for a four plex.
plans are 20 years and the engineers stamp is not legible.

These

Building codes and standards have changed dramatically over a
period of 20 years. These plans must be reviewed and re-stamped by
a Licensed Architect or engineer prior to approval by the Sevier
County Building Department.
Thank You for your attention to this matter.

John [L. Hicks,
Sevier County
Building Official.
JLH:lmj
cc:

Salina City Planning Commission
Mr. Paul Lyman / Salina City Attorney

ADDENDUM C

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS

AIA Document B1S1

Abbreviated Form of Agreement Between
Owner and Architect
For Construction Projects of Limited Scope
1978 EDITION
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES; CONSULTATION WITH
AN ATTORNEY IS ENCOURAGED WITH RESPECT TO ITS COMPLETION OR

MOD!HCATiON

AGREEMENT
made as of the 30th
Hundred and Seventy Eight
BETWEEN the Owner:

and the Architect:

da

Y°f

October

in the year of Nineteen

Derek & Dana Andreason
355 Sandy Lane
Salina , Utah
s > Rowley, A. I . A .
8 N. 200 W.
Cedar City, Utah

John

For the following Project:
(Includes detailed description of Project location and scope.)

D & D Development Apartment
Salina , Utah

Village Four-Plex

On old State Street

The Owner and the Architect agree as set forth below.
Copyright 1974, © 1978 by The American Institute of Architects, 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C 20006.
Reproduction of the material herein or substantial quotation of its provisions without permission of the AIA violates
the copyright laws of the United States and will be subject to legal prosecution.
AIA DOCUMENT B1S1 •
ABBREVIATED OWNER-ARCHITECT ACREEMENT • JUNE 1978 EDITION • AIA«
<a w » . THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C 20006
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Terms and Conditions of Agreement Between Owner and Architect
ARTICLE 1
ARCHITECT'S SERVICES
AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Architect's Basic Services are as described under the four Phases identified below and in Article
10, and unless otherwise provided in Article 10,
include normal structural, mechanical and electrical engineering services,
1.1
DESIGN PHASE
1.1.1 The Architect shall review with the Owner alternative approaches to design and construction of the Project.
1.1.2 Based on the mutually accepted program and Project budget requirements, the Architect shall prepare, for
approval by the Owner, Design Documents consisting of
drawings and other documents appropriate for the Project, and shall submit to the Owner a Statement of Probable Construction Cost.
1.2

CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTS PHASE

1.2.1 Based on the approved Design Documents, the Architect shall prepare, for approval by the Owner, Construction Documents consisting of Drawings and Specifications setting forth in detail the requirements for the
construction of the Project and shall advise the Owner
of any adjustments to previous Statements of Probable
Construction Cost.
1.2.2 The Architect shall assist the Owner in connection
with the Owner's responsibility for filing documents required for the approval of governmental authorities having jurisdiction over the Project.
1.3
BIDDING OR NEGOTIATION PHASE
1.3.1 Unless provided in Article 10, the Architect, following the Owner's approval of the Construction Documents and of the most recent Statement of Probable Construction Cost, shall assist the Owner in obtaining bids or
negotiated proposals and in awarding contracts for construction.
1.4

CONSTRUCTION PHASE—ADMINISTRATION OF THE
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

1.4.1 The Construction Phase will commence with the
award of the Contract for Construction and will terminate
when final payment to the Contractor is due, or in the
absence of a final Certificate for Payment or of such due
date, sixty days after the Date of Substantial Completion
of the Work, whichever occurs first.
1.4.2 Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement and
incorporated in the Contract Documents, the Architect
shall provide administration of the Contract for Construction as set forth below and in the edition of AIA Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, current as of the date of this Agreement.
1.4.3 The Architect shall be a representative of the
Owner during the Construction Phase. Instructions to the
Contractor shall be forwarded through the Architect.

1.4.4 The Architect shall visit the site at intervals appropriate to the stage of construction or as otherwise agreed
by the Architect in writing to become generally familiar
with the progress and quality of the Work and to determine in general if the Work is proceeding in accordance
with the Contract Documents. However, the Architect
shall not be required to make exhaustive or continuous
on-site inspections to check the quality or quantity of the
Work. On the basis of such on-site observations as an
architect, the Architect shall keep the Owner informed of
the progress and quality of the Work, and shall endeavor
to guard the Owner against defects and deficiencies in the
Work of the Contractor.
1.4.5 The Architect shall not have control or charge of
and shall not be responsible for construction means,
methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or for
safety precautions and programs in connection with the
Work, for the acts or omissions of the Contractor, Subcontractors or any other persons performing any of the
Work, or for the failure of any of them to carry out the
Work in accordance with the Contract Documents.
1.4.6 The Architect shall at all times have access to the
Work wherever it is in preparation and progress.
1.4.7 The Architect shall determine the amounts owing
to the Contractor based on observations at the site and
on evaluations of the Contractor's Applications for Payment, and shall issue Certificates for Payment in such
amounts.
1.4.8 The issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall constitute a representation by the Architect to the Owner,
based on the Architect's observations at the site as provided in Subparagraph 1.4.4 and on the data comprising
the Contractor's Application for Payment, that, to the best
of the Architect's knowledge, information and belief, the
Work has progressed to the point indicated; the quality of
the Work is \t\ accordance with the Contract Documents
(subject to an evaluation of the Work for conformance
with the Contract Documents upon Substantial Completion, to the results of any subsequent tests required by or
performed under the Contract Documents, to minor
deviations from the Contract Documents correctable prior
to completion, and to any specific qualifications stated in
the Certificate for Payment); and that the Contractor is
entitled to payment in the amount certified. However, the
issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall not be a representation that the Architect has made any examination to
ascertain how and for what purpose the Contractor has
used the moneys paid on account of the Contract Sum.
1.4.9 The Architect shall be the interpreter of the requirements of the Contract Documents and the judge of
the performance thereunder by both the Owner and
Contractor, and shall render written decisions on all
claims, disputes and other matters in question between
the Owner and the Contractor. In the capacity of interpreter and judge, the Architect shall endeavor to secure
faithful performance by both the Owner and the Contractor, shall not show partiality to either, and shall not be
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liable for the result of any interpretation or decision
rendered in good faith in such capacity.
1.4.10 The Architect shall have authority to reject Work
which does not conform to the Contract Documents, and
will have authority to require special inspection or testing
of the Work whenever, in the Architect's reasonable opinion, it is necessary or advisable for the implementation of
the intent of the Contract Documents.
1.4.11 The Architect shall review and approve or take
other appropriate action upon the Contractor's submittals
such as Shop Drawings, Product Data and Samples, but
only for conformance with the design concept of the
Work and with the information given in the Contract
Documents. Such action shall be taken with reasonable
promptness so as to cause no delay. The Architect's approval of a specific item shall not indicate approval of an
assembly of which the item is a component.
1.4.12 The Architect shall prepare Change Orders for the
Owner's approval and execution, and shall have authority
to order minor changes in the Work not involving an
adjustment in the Contract Sum or an extension of the
Contract Time.
1.4.13 The Architect shall conduct inspections to determine the Dates of Substantial Completion and final completion, and shall issue a final Certificate for Payment.
1.4.14 The extent of the duties, responsibilities and limitations of authority of the Architect as the Owner's representative during construction shall not be modified or extended without written consent of the Owner, the Contractor and the Architect.
1.5

ADDITIONAL SERVICES

1.5.1 Additional Services shall be provided if authorized
or confirmed in writing by the Owner or if included in
Article 10, and they shall be paid for by the Owner as
provided in this Agreement.
1.5.2 If the Owner and the Architect agree that more
extensive representation at the site than is described in
Paragraph 1.4 shall be provided, such additional project
representation shall be provided and paid for as set forth
in Article 10.
1.6
TIME
1.6.1 The Architect shall perform services as expeditiously as is consistent with professional skill and care and
the orderly progress of the Work.
ARTICLE 2
THE OWNER'S RESPONSIBILITIES
The following services and responsibilities, and
any others so indicated in Article 10, shall be undertaken by the Owner.
2.1
The Owner shall provide full information including
a program, which shall set forth the Owner's design
objectives, constraints and criteria.
2.2
The Owner shall furnish a legal description and a
certified land survey of the site and the services of soil
engineers or other consultants when such services are
deemed necessary by the Architect.
2.3
The Owner shall furnish structural, mechanical,
chemical and other laboratory tests, inspections and re3
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ports as required by law or the Contract Documents.
2.4
The Owner shall furnish ail legal, accounting and
insurance counseling services as may be necessary at any
time for the Project, including such auditing services as
the Owner may require to verify the Contractor's Applications for Payment or to ascertain how or for what purposes the Contractor uses the moneys paid by the Owner.
2.5
The services, information, surveys and reports required by Paragraphs 2.2 through 2.4 inclusive shall be
furnished at the Owner's expense, and the Architect shall
be entitled to rely upon the accuracy and completeness
thereof.
2.6
If the Owner observes or otherwise becomes aware
of any fault or defect in the Project or nonconformance
with the Contract Documents, prompt written notice
thereof shall be given by the Owner to the Architect.
2.7
The Owner shall furnish required information and
shall render approvals and decisions as expeditiously as
necessary for the orderly progress of the Architect's services and of the Work.
ARTICLE 3
CONSTRUCTION COST
3.1

DEFINITION

3.1.1 The Construction Cost shall be the total cost or
estimated cost to the Owner of all elements of the Project
designed or specified by the Architect.
3.1.2 The Construction Cost shall include at current market rates, including a reasonable allowance for overhead
and profit, the cost of labor and materials furnished by
the Owner and any equipment which has been designed,
specified, selected or specially provided for by the Architect.
3.1.3 Construction Cost does not include the compensation of the Architect and the Architect's consultants, the
cost of the land, rights-of-way, or other costs which are
the responsibility of the Owner as provided in Article 2.
3.2

RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTRUCTION COST

3.2.1 It is recognized that neither the Architect nor the
Owner has control over the cost of labor, materials or
equipment, over the Contractor's methods of determining
bid prices, or over competitive bidding, market or negotiating conditions. Accordingly, the Architect cannot and
does not warrant or represent that bids or negotiated
prices will not vary from any Statement of Probable Construction Cost or other cost estimate or evaluation prepared by the Architect.
3.2.2 No fixed limit of Construction Cost shall be established as a condition of this Agreement by the furnishing,
proposal or establishment of a Project budget, unless such
fixed limit has been agreed upon in writing and signed by
the parties hereto. If such a fixed limit has been established, the Architect shall be permitted to include contingencies for design, bidding and price escalation, to determine what materials, equipment, component systems
and types of construction are to be included in the Contract Documents, to make reasonable adjustments in the
scope of the Project and to include in the Contract Documents Alternate Bids to adjust the Construction Cost to
the fixed limit. Any such fixed limit shall be increased in
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the amount of any increase in the Contract Sum occurring
after execution of the Contract for Construction.
3.2.3 Any Project budget or fixed limit of Construction
Cost shall be adjusted to reflect any change in the general
level of prices in the construction industry between the
date of submission of the Construction Documents to the
Owner and the date on which proposals are sought.
3.2.4 If a fixed limit of Construction Cost (adjusted as
provided in Subparagraph 3.2.3) is exceeded by the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated proposal, the Owner shall
(1) give written approval of an increase in such fixed limit,
(2) authorize rebidding or renegotiating of the Project
within a reasonable time, (3) if the Project is abandoned,
terminate in accordance with Paragraph 7.2, or (4) cooperate in revising the Project scope and quality as required
to reduce the Construction Cost. In the case of (4), provided a fixed limit of Construction Cost has been established as a condition of this Agreement, the Architect,
without additional charge, shall modify the Drawings and
Specifications as necessary to comply with the fixed limit.
The providing of such service shall be the limit of the
Architect's responsibility arising from the establishment of
such fixed limit, and having done so, the Architect shall
be entitled to compensation for all services performed, in
accordance with this Agreement, whether or not the Construction Phase is commenced.

ARTICLE 4
PAYMENTS TO THE ARCHITECT
4.1
An initial payment as set forth in Paragraph 9.1 is
the minimum payment under this Agreement.
4.2
Subsequent payments for Basic Services shall be
made monthly and shall be in proportion to services performed within each Phase.
4.3
When compensation is based on a percentage of
Construction Cost, and any portions of the Project are
deleted or otherwise not constructed, compensation for
such portions of the Project shall be payable to the extent
services are performed on such portions, in accordance
with the schedule set forth in Subparagraph 9.2.2, based
on (1) the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated proposal, or
(2) if no such bid or proposal is received, the most recent
Statement of Probable Construction Cost.
4.4
Reimbursable Expenses include actual expenditures
made by the Architect in the interest of the Project for:
.1 expense of transportation and living expenses in
connection with out-of-town travel, authorized by
the Owner,
.2 long distance communications,
•3 fees paid for securing approval of authorities having jurisdiction over the Project,
,4 reproductions,
•5 postage and handling of Drawings and Specifications,
.6 renderings and models requested by the Owner,
.7 expense of overtime work requiring higher than
regular rates, if authorized by the Owner,
.8 expense of any additional insurance coverage or
limits, including professional liability insurance,
requested by the Owner in excess of that normally

carried by the Architect and the Architect's consultants.
4.5
Payments on account of the Architect's Additional
Services and for Reimbursable Expenses as defined in
Paragraph 4.4 shall be made monthly upon presentation
of the Architect's statement of services rendered or expenses incurred.
4.6
No deductions shall be made from the Architect's
compensation on account of sums withheld from payments to contractors.
4.7
If the Project is suspended or abandoned in whole
or in part for more than three months, the Architect shall
be compensated for all services performed prior to receipt
of written notice from the Owner of such suspension or
abandonment, together with Reimbursable Expenses then
due and all Termination Expenses as defined in Paragraph
7.4. If the Project is resumed after being suspended for
more than three months, the Architect's compensation
shall be equitably adjusted.
ARTICLES
OWNERSHIP AND USE OF DOCUMENTS
5.1
Drawings and Specifications as instruments of service are and shall remain the property of the Architect
whether the Project for which they are made is executed
or not. The Owner shall be permitted to retain copies, including reproducible copies, of Drawings and Specifications for information and reference in connection with
the Owner's use and occupancy of the Project. The Drawings and Specifications shall not be used by the Owner on
other projects, for additions to this Project, or for completion of this Project by others provided the Architect is
not in default under this Agreement, except by agreement
in writing and with appropriate compensation to the
Architect.
5.2
Submission or distribution to meet official regulatory requirements or for other purposes in connection
with the Project is not to be construed as publication in
derogation of the Architect's rights.
ARTICLE 6
ARBITRATION
6.1
All claims, disputes and other matters in question
between the parties to this Agreement, arising out of or
relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be
decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. No arbitration, arising out of or relating to this Agreement, shall include, by consolidation,
joinder or in any other manner, any additional person
not a party to this Agreement except by written consent
containing a specific reference to this Agreement and
signed by the Architect, the Owner, and any other person
sought to be joined. Any consent to arbitration involving
an additional person or persons shall not constitute consent to arbitration of any dispute not described therein.
This Agreement to arbitrate and any agreement to arbitrate with an additional person or persons duly consented
to by the parties to this Agreement shall be specifically
enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law.
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6.2
In no event shall the demand for arbitration be
made after the date when institution of legal or equitable
proceedings based on such claim, dispute or other matter
in question would be barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.
6.3
The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be
final, and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance
with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction
thereof.
ARTICLE 7
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
7.1
This Agreement may be terminated by either party
upon seven days' written notice should the other party
fail substantially to perform in accordance with its terms
through no fault of the party initiating the termination.
7.2
This Agreement may be terminated by the Owner
upon at least seven days' written notice to the Architect
in the event that the Project is permanently abandoned.
7.3
In the event of termination not the fault of the
Architect, the Architect shall be compensated for all
services performed to termination date, together with Reimbursable Expenses then due and all Termination Expenses as defined in Paragraph 7.4.
7.4
Termination Expenses include expenses directly attributable to termination for which the Architect is not
otherwise compensated, plus an amount computed as a
percentage of the total compensation earned to the time
of termination, as follows:
.1 20 percent if termination occurs during the Design
Phase, or

5
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.2 10 percent if termination occurs during the Construction Documents Phase, or
.3 5 percent if termination occurs during any subsequent phase.
ARTICLE 8
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
8.1
This Agreement shall be governed by the law of
the principal place of business of the Architect.
8.2
As between the parties to this Agreement: as to all
acts or failures to act by either party to this Agreement,
any applicable statute of limitations shall commence to
run and any alleged cause of action shall be deemed to
have accrued in any and all events not later than the
relevant Date of Substantial Completion of the Work, and
as to any acts or failures to act occurring after the relevant
Date of Substantial Completion, not later than the date of
issuance of the final Certificate for Payment.
8.3
The Owner and the Architect, respectively, bind
themselves, their partners, successors, assigns and legal
representatives to the other party to this Agreement and
to the partners, successors, assigns and legal representatives of such party with respect to all covenants of this
Agreement. Neither the Owner nor the Architect shall
assign, sublet or transfer any interest in this Agreement
without the written consent of the other.
8.4
This Agreement represents the entire and integrated agreement between the Owner and the Architect
and supersedes all prior negotiations, representations or
agreements, either written or oral. This Agreement may be
amended only by written instrument signed by both
Owner and Architect.
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